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Abstract. Parallel computing offers the chance of improving the efficiency of
Garbled Circuit technique in multi-party computation protocols. We propose two
different types of parallelization: fine-grained, based on the parallel evaluation of
gates, and coarse grained, based on the parallelization of macro-blocks. To an-
alyze the efficiency of parallel implementation, a biometric scenario, having an
intrinsically parallel nature, is considered. Moreover our approach is compared to
previous works by using a privacy preserving implementation of AES encryption.
We show that both fine-grained and coarse-grained solutions provide significant
runtime improvements. Better results are obtained by the coarse-grained paral-
lelization, which, however, can be exploited only when the same block is used
more than once in parallel, whereas fine-grained parallelization can be applied to
any garbled circuit.
Keywords: Parallel Computing, Multi-Party Computation, Signal Processing in
the Encrypted Domain, Garbled Circuits
1 Introduction
Rapid technological advances in multi-party signal processing have given rise to a va-
riety of new signal processing applications for which security aspects can no longer
be dealt with by classical cryptographic methods. The classical security model is tar-
geted toward protecting the communication of two trusted parties against a potentially
malevolent third party. In such cases, it is sufficient that secure cryptographic primitives
are applied on top of transmission and processing modules. In an increasing number of
applications, however, the classical security model is no longer adequate since at least
one of the parties involved in the communication, distribution or processing of the data
may not be trustworthy.
Multi-Party Computation (MPC) provides a clever way to process data without re-
vealing any details about the data itself during the processing. When the to-be-processed
data is a signal [11,20], MPC is customarily referred to as S.P.E.D. (Signal Processing
in the Encrypted Domain), since signal protection is usually achieved by encrypting
the signals and processing them in encrypted form. Possible applications of MPC are
virtually endless. For example, a database server may be untrustworthy [1], creating the
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need to hide the content of queries to the database server, while still allowing the query
to be resolved. As another example, we may consider a remote diagnosis service [4,21],
where a non-trusted party is tasked with processing sensitive medical data without leak-
ing the private data of the patient (including the diagnosis results). The use of MPC for
biometric identification and access control is also gaining popularity since it permits to
protect the privacy of the biometric owners in client server applications. Many types of
biometries have been addressed in S.P.E.D. analysis, including: face recognition [10],
fingerprinting identification [2,3], iris identification [23], etc. Besides the scenarios al-
ready outlined, we also recall user preferences [12], watermarking [9], digital rights
management [14].
In a two-party computation (2PC) protocol, two players, usually referred to as Alice
and Bob, are interested in cooperating to evaluate a given public function z = f (x;y),
where x and y are the inputs owned by Alice and Bob respectively, and where neither
Alice nor Bob wants to disclose her/his inputs to the other party. At the end of the proto-
col, the output will be available to one party between Alice and Bob, or to both of them.
Yao’s Garbled Circuits theory (GC) [30,31] is one of the most used approaches to pri-
vate computing. In its seminal work, Yao showed that any polynomial size functionality
f (·) can be evaluated privately in a constant number of rounds, with polynomial com-
munication and computational overhead. GC allows the evaluation of the binary circuit
implementing f (x,y) on input bits privately owned by Alice and Bob, so that the final
result is available to one of them (or both), whereas intermediate values cannot be dis-
covered by any of the parties. Yao’s protocol has long been thought to be of theoretical
interest only due to its complexity. However, recent works have shown several ways to
improve GCs efficiency, making them usable even in practical scenarios. Parallel eval-
uation of circuits is surely one of such methods, however even though it is known that
GC can benefit from parallelization, no benchmark analysis has been provided before.
In this paper we describe two ways whereby parallel computing can significantly
improve the GC efficiency. Parallel computing has been used in scientific applications
for decades in fields like fluid dynamics, material science, weather forecasts. Recently,
due to the difficulties of further reducing the clock rate of the processors, all CPU ven-
dors are investing, for the sake of better performance, on multi and many-core archi-
tectures, so parallel processing is becoming common practice in many other fields. Due
to specific features of GC, briefly recalled in Section 2, parallel processing of GC re-
quires a paradigm that entails an overhead as limited as possible for the management of
parallel tasks.
Related Work. Several implementations of GC have been already proposed, starting
from Fairplay [24], FairplaySPF [27], Tasty [15], etc. To the best of our knowledge,
currently, the most efficient implementation in the semi-honest setting is the one pre-
sented in [16].
Recently also some parallel implementations have been proposed. In [29], GPU
is used for parallel implementation of specific operations needed by the GC protocol,
whereas [13] uses GPU processors for GC implementation in the malicious setting.
Our Contribution. In this paper we demonstrate that GC can take advantage of parallel
computation, especially when the representation of the required functionality results in
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a very large circuit. We address two different types of parallelization: the first one, fine-
grained parallelization, is based on the parallelization of the single gates composing a
circuit, while the second one, coarse-grained parallelization, is based on macro-blocks
parallelization. The proposed solutions are evaluated by running them on multi-core
processors. In particular, we resort to threads for parallel processing of GC since they
run very efficiently on modern CPUs and offer all the synchronization mechanisms re-
quired to prevent race conditions in the evaluation of GC. For our tests a biometric
identification scenario has been chosen, for its high parallel nature. Moreover, to com-
pare our results to previous implementations, a privacy preserving implementation of
AES encryption [8] has been tested as well.
Outline. In Section 2 the basis of the GC scheme is presented; in Section 3 we present
our parallel implementations, whose application to privacy preserving biometric sce-
narios and AES encryption is presented in Section 4, together with the obtained results
and a security analysis. Finally some conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Garbled circuit (GC) is an elegant method for secure function evaluation of boolean
circuits. The general idea of GCs, going back to Yao [30,31], is to encrypt (garble)
each wire and gate with a symmetric encryption scheme.
Yao’s Protocol At a high-level, Yao’s GC protocol works as follows: in the setup phase,
the constructor (Bob) generates an encrypted version of the function f (represented as
boolean circuit), called garbled circuit f˜ . To that purpose, he assigns to each wire wi of
f two randomly chosen garbled values w˜0i , w˜
1
i (symmetric keys) of t bits each (security
parameter set equal to t = 80 for short-term security), that correspond to the respective
values 0 and 1. Note that w˜vi does not reveal any information about the plain value
v as both keys look random. Then, for each gate of f , the constructor creates helper
information in form of a garbled table T˜i that allows to decrypt only the output key from
the gate’s input keys. Each table is used to find the correct value of the output wire of the
gate given a specific value on each of the garbled gate’s input wires. By expressing the
functionality of a given gate as γ=G(α,β), where α∈{0,1} and β∈{0,1} are the input
wires of the gate while γ∈ {0,1} is the gate’s output wire, then the garbled computation
table is a random permutation of Ew˜α
(
Ew˜β(w˜
γ|check)) for all the four possible input
pairs, (α,β), using some symmetric encryption function Ekey(·) and appending a check
sequence to the garbled output that helps the identification of the correct row.
The garbled circuit f˜ , consisting of the garbled tables generated from the gates, is
sent to the evaluator (Alice). Later, in the online phase, Alice obliviously obtains the
garbled values x˜ and y˜ corresponding to the plain inputs x and y of Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. To convert a plain input bit yi of Bob into its garbled version, Bob simply
sends the key y˜yii to Alice. Similarly, Alice must obtain the garbled secret x˜
xi
i correspond-
ing to her input bit xi, avoiding that Bob learns xi. This can be achieved by running,
possibly in parallel, for each bit xi of x, a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol
[25]. OT is a cryptographic protocol taking as input Alice’s choice bit b = xi and Bob’s
strings s0 = x˜0i and s
1 = x˜1i . The protocol guarantees that Alice obtains only the chosen
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string sb = x˜xii while Bob learns no information on b = xi. Afterwords, Alice evaluates
the garbled circuit f˜ on x˜, y˜ by evaluating the garbled gates one-by-one decrypting the
rows of the associated tables, where the correct decryption is identified by the check
sequence. Finally, Alice obtains the corresponding garbled output values z˜ which can
be decrypted into the corresponding plain output z = f (x,y).
OT implementation To efficiently implement OT, the following techniques are used:
Pre-computing OT [6] allows moving computation and communication burden to
the setup phase, where both parties run the OT protocol on random inputs. This makes
secrets generation independent from circuit execution. Then, in the more time-critical
online phase, Alice and Bob use those random inputs to mask their real inputs with a
one-time pad. OT secrets, that have been produced in the offline phase, are “consumed”
by retrieving them from the files, where they have been stored by the offline generator
procedure. The same secret is never used twice in the same or other circuits.
Extending OT efficiently [17] allows for the reduction of the computation complexity
during the setup phase by replacing n parallel OTs of t-bit-strings with t parallel OTs of
t-bit strings performed in the opposite direction, followed by other computations that
extends the number of OT.
Implementation over elliptic curves permits the implementation of efficient OT
protocols, evaluating n parallel OTs of `-bit strings, implemented efficiently with the
protocol of [25] over elliptic curves. The use of elliptic curves allows to perform oper-
ations on and transmit shorter cyphertexts with respect to group Zn. Unfortunately the
computation complexity of the protocol increases, but the communication complexity
reduction results in a significant decrease of the execution time, since communication
between parties is a critical component of the execution.
Optimized GCs While Yao’s GC formulation does not take into account the problem of
the efficiency, many improvements have been proposed in the last years. The principal
improvements can be summarized as follows.
First of all for efficient implementation of GC, a random oracle H(·) is used. It is
usually instantiated with a suitably chosen cryptographic hash function such as SHA-
256 [26]. Hence symmetric encryption of the gate rows is performed as
Ew˜α
(
Ew˜β(w˜
γ|check))= (w˜γ|check)⊕H(w˜α|w˜β|s) (1)
where s is a gate identifier.
The point and permute technique [24] allows the evaluator to decrypt directly the
correct row, resulting in a double advantage: only a single call to the encryption function
for each gate is needed during evaluation and the check sequence is no longer necessary,
reducing the dimension of the garbled tables. The idea is to associate a single permuta-
tion bit pii ∈{0,1} to each wire i. The garbled value associated to the wire is w˜i|ci, where
ci = bi⊕pii. Each row of the garbled table is hence computed as (w˜γ|cγ)⊕H(w˜α|w˜β|s)
and the rows of the garbled tables are permuted according to the input permutation bits.
In such a way, during evaluation, the correct row is directly selected by observing cα
and cβ.
Another important improvement is the free-XOR technique [19]. Garbled XOR
gates require no garbled table and negligible computation. A global key ∆ is randomly
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chosen and the secrets for each wire i are generated so that w˜i1 = w˜
i
0⊕∆. The output wire
of a XOR gate having input wires α and β is computed as (w˜γ|cγ) = (w˜α|cα)⊕ (w˜β|cβ).
Finally Garbled Row Reduction [28] can also be used to reduce the size of non-
XOR gates by eliminating a row in each garbled table, resulting in a ≈ 25% reduction
of non-XOR gate garbling, transmission and evaluation times.
Our implementation To evaluate the benefits provided by parallel evaluation, we im-
plemented our version of GC tools. Our C++ implementation of Garbled Circuits relies
on the object-oriented paradigm to guarantee reusable code and consistent modules in-
teraction. An efficient implementation has been obtained by implementing the principal
tricks presented above, except OT implementation over elliptic curves and Garbled Row
Reduction. Even if such techniques would improve the protocol efficiency, their absence
does not compromise the comparison between the sequential GC implementation and
the parallel implementations.
We consider that by using the extending OT technique, blocks of 1 million OTs are
precomputed and stored, so that when a given number of OT are evaluated online, the
same number of precomputed OTs are picked, used and removed from the memory.
In our implementation we evaluate ≈ 200000 offline OTs in a second. It is important
to underline that we consider the function f that Alice and Bob are going to jointly
evaluate, to be known before they have the input values, hence garbling and garbled
circuit transmission can also be performed in the setup phase.
3 Circuit Parallelization
As mentioned above, many recent works have improved the efficiency of GC. Here-
after, we demonstrate that the evaluation of GC can also take advantage from parallel
execution. Parallel processing can be used for both OT, where bits are independent
from each other, and processing of those gates that, depending on the circuit, can be
garbled/evaluated in any order.
With respect to other GC implementations, in OT parallelization, we have paral-
lelized secrets generation, by computing multiple bits at the same time and the protocol
used to securely exchange secrets, the Bellare-Micali protocol [7], whose computation
is divided in offline and online phases. Gate parallelization strongly depends on the
characteristics of the to be evaluated function, so a flexible and low-overhead paral-
lelization technique is required. Threads fulfill both requirements: on multi-processor
or multi-core systems, they can concurrently be assigned to each processor or core
running a thread of the same process (or task) and the time required to create and syn-
chronize them is much lower with respect to standard processes. Threads are supported
at both language (e.g., Java) and operating system level (pthreads in Unix-like OS and
winthreads in Windows). In the present work we resort to pthreads programmed in C++
and the resulting GC evaluation engine runs seamlessly under Unix and Mac OS. Port-
ing to Windows is possible simply by replacing the calls to pthreads with invocation of
winthreads primitives.
Two different kinds of parallelization are considered: fine-grained, corresponding to
classic parallelization of single gates evaluation and our new subdivision of the circuit
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into layers, where with layer we intend a subset of the circuit’s gates that can be eval-
uated independently from other gates by Garbler and Evaluator; and coarse-grained,
considered here for the first time where macro blocks composing the circuit are paral-
lelized. Inside each macro block, gates can again be evaluated in parallel.
3.1 Fine-grained parallelization
In fine-grained parallelization, the gates of the circuit are subdivided into layers, such
that all the gates in the same layer can be evaluated in parallel. No special attention
is needed during circuit design, that is performed as usual. Later, the circuit is parsed,
so that the gates are sorted to ease the parallel execution. The gates connected only to
input wires are placed in layer 0. Then the gates having, at least, one input wire coming
from a gate in layer 0 are placed in layer 1. The procedure is then iterated on all the
gates, placing a gate having input wires obtained as output from two gates respectively
already in layers i and j, in layer max(i, j)+ 1. In the end of the scanning procedure,
all the gates of the circuit are grouped in layers. Almost contemporaneously to us, a
similar scheme for gate parallelization has been proposed also in [13], although their
target platform are the Graphics Processing Units (GPU).
It is important to underline that the sorted circuit can be garbled and evaluated se-
quentially or by using threads that permit the parallel elaboration of gates in the same
layer. This permits a sequential execution from a single core system, while in multi core
systems, to prevent from incurring in a slow down caused by an insufficient work load
for each thread, there is a minimum number of gates per thread that can be executed
in parallel. If the number is lower than the threshold the execution is serialized. If we
indicate with ∆t the time that can be saved by running the level in parallel, we have the
condition ∆t = St−(Pt +C)> 0 if St−Pt >C where Pt is the execution time in parallel,
St is the serial execution time and C is the overhead introduced by the management of
the threads (creation, synchronization, etc.).
Having different garbling/evaluation procedures, we analyze separately the paral-
lelization of XOR gates and non-XOR gates. Thanks to [19], circuits are designed to
reduce the number of non-XOR gates and, as a result, XOR gates are usually the most
common gate type (e.g., in our circuits 74%, on average). As expected, the computa-
tional burden necessary to execute them is less than that required by other gates. Nev-
ertheless for large circuits there is such a high number of XOR gates per level to justify
parallelization on this phase. As a matter of fact, we obtain a good speedup when ex-
ecuting in parallel XOR gates for large circuits. Non-XOR gates are generic gates that
can have an arbitrary number of inputs and any truth table (usually plain gates are often
used to execute AND, OR operations with 2 inputs). That class of gates has a major
impact on computation time since, for each gate, it is necessary to cipher its truth table
associated to the possible secrets’ combinations on inputs. The ciphering requires the
execution of a SHA-256 hash function and several XOR operations on the gate secret
inputs. For non-XOR gates we have parallelized only the creation and the ciphering of
the truth table. This is in charge of the Garbler that afterward sends the result through
the communication channel. NOT gates, that can be also evaluated for free, are not very
expensive in computational terms and also relatively few even for large circuits. As a
consequence, we did not develop a parallel procedure for the execution of NOT gates.
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In our solution we resort to CPU threads for parallelization since the grain of the
computation hardly justifies the usage of hundreds of relatively slow cores like those
available in a GPU. CPU threads have a very low creation overhead and can be managed
in a dynamic way depending on the features of the circuit under evaluation (i.e., the
number of gates in each layer).
3.2 Coarse-grained parallelization
A macro block parallelization presents many advantages, but requires some substantial
changes in the protocol. The possibility of dividing a circuit in blocks makes the circuit
representation easier, since the developer can design and test small parts of the circuit.
Moreover, there is no need to repeat the design of identical parts of the circuit, as often
happens in protocols where the same operation is repeated on different inputs. Finally
this solution reduces the overhead introduced by thread management, since, while in
fine-grained parallelization in each layer a thread is created and then destroyed for each
gate, here a thread is created for groups of gates.
To design a circuit by using macro blocks it is necessary to define also secret inputs
and outputs, besides the classical evaluator and garbler inputs and outputs. A secret
input is a sequence of bits, obtained as output from another macro block, that can not
be revealed to either the garbler and the evaluator. In practice, secret inputs/outputs
are used to connect different blocks. Obviously, in the design phase, particular atten-
tion must be paid to the dimension of secret inputs and outputs to avoid inconsistency
problems. For a good design, it can be useful to handle the evaluator and garbler input
association phase by using one or more blocks that accept plain inputs and return the
associated secrets.
During garbling it is important to use the same global key ∆ for all the circuits, then
garbling is performed as usual, paying attention to the pair of input secrets. Obviously,
if the same macro-block is used more than once in the circuit (with different secret
inputs), each instance needs to be garbled independently from the others, because, as
usual, if the same garbled circuit is evaluated twice with different inputs, the security of
the protocol is compromised. Garbling of macro blocks that can be processed in parallel
is assigned to different threads.
Evaluation is performed as usual, the only change consists in the requirement of
storing the secrets obtained as outputs of a block to assign them to the inputs of another
block. Macro blocks that can be evaluated in parallel are assigned to different threads.
Even if blocks evaluated in parallel can be different, when the same block is gar-
bled/evaluated multiple times in parallel, the operations performed by the threads can be
driven together, because they perform the same operation on different values. Beyond
the easy design and the parallelization, this solution results in another, non negligible,
advantage: the file containing the description of a macro block that is garbled/evaluated
multiple times in parallel is read only once, reducing the memory load.
4 Analysis
To provide an analysis of the benefits introduced by the parallel evaluation we consider
a biometric matching problem and AES encryption of a large amount of data. For both
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scenarios, we compare the sequential implementation to the parallel implementations
(fine-grained, coarse grained and coarse-grained with fine-grained parallelization inside
the blocks). We show how the results change as a function of the number of available
threads and the time needed by each phase of the computation. Finally we provide a
security analysis of the two implementations.
4.1 Iris identification
As first example, we consider the iris identification protocol proposed in [23], modified
so that the final result is the index of the best match, if exceeding a given threshold,
instead of a simple answer that specifies if the tested biometry is in the database or not.
The parameters are chosen according to the original paper and their values are specified
during the description.
In such protocol, the biometric server, Bob, has an iris gallery which stores the iris
features {X1, . . . ,Xn} of n= 1023 members. Xi is a binary vector denoted as (xi,1, . . . ,xi,`),
where `= 2048. The user, Alice, provides a probe q = (q1, . . . ,q`) and evaluates the GC
which produces a match if there exists at least an i∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that d(q,Xi)< ε for
a similarity threshold ε. d(q,Xi) is a modified Hamming Distance (HD) defined below:
d(q,Xi) :=
D(q,Xi)
M(q,Xi)
=
||(q⊗Xi)∩maskq∩maskXi ||
||maskq∩maskXi ||
, (2)
where ⊗ denotes XOR, ∩ AND, and || · || the norm of the binary vector; maskq and
maskXi are the corresponding binary masks that zero out the unusable portion of the
irises due to occlusion by eyelids and eyelash, specular reflections, boundary artifacts
of lenses, or poor signal-to-noise ratio. Considering that masks do not disclose sensitive
information about the subjects, as demonstrated in [23], a common mask can be used.
Mask filtering is performed in the plain domain on all the irises by Alice and Bob and
together they can compute the distances
d′(q,Xi) :=
HD(mask(q),mask(Xi))
||CM|| , (3)
where HD(·) denotes the Hamming distance and mask(·) is the masking function with
the common mask, identified by CM.
At this point, given an acceptance threshold ε, the index of the best match can be
obtained as argmin(ε,{d′(q,Xi)}ni=1). If the return value is equal to 0 there is no match.
We underline that, for simplicity, we can reformulate the problem as
argmin(||CM||ε , {HD(mask(q),mask(Xi)}ni=1). (4)
The protocol can be implemented by the circuit shown in Figure 1, where the Ham-
ming distance is computed by XOR gates between the two inputs and a COUNTER
circuit [5], whereas the argMIN tree is implemented as in [18]. The circuit is composed
by approximately 6.3 millions of gates,1.1 millions of which are non-free gates.
While fine-grained parallelization is applied on a single circuit implementing Fig-
ure 1, segmented in 356 layers, coarse-grained parallelization needs subdvision into
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sub-blocks. We can identify the following blocks, whose composition is shown in Fig-
ure 2:
− n Garbler input interfaces for Bob’s iris templates, each one converting one `-bit
long input in ` t-bit long secrets;
− 1 Evaluator input interface for Alice’s iris template query, converting one `-bit long
input in ` secrets;
- 1 Garbler input interface for acceptance threshold ε, converting one dlog2 `e-bit long
input in dlog2 `e secrets;
− n Hamming distances, each one having 2 inputs composed by ` secrets and 1 output
composed by dlog2 `e secrets;
- 1 argMIN tree, having n inputs represented with dlog2 `e secrets and returning an in-
dex represented with dlog2 n+1e bits (output interface is included in the block).
The index of the best match is obtained by a reverse argMIN tree having dlog2 n+1e
levels and n+ 1 inputs, where the input0 is the threshold and the inputi is the output
of the i-th Hamming distance. The i-th level (i = 0 . . .dlog2 n+1e−1) is composed by
d n+12i+1 eMIN blocks. Each MIN selector circuit in level 0 outputs the secret relative to the
minimum value together with a secret related to a bit signaling whether the minimum
value is in the left (1) or in the right (0) input. The other MIN selector circuit in the tree
has two input values coming from the two sub-trees connected to their inputs. These
values are composed by the highest sub-tree’s input and the relative position in the sub-
tree. The MIN selector circuit outputs the secrets corresponding to the highest value
concatenated with the subtree index, preceded by a bit assuming the value 0 whether
the output comes from right subtree or 1 if it comes from left subtree. In such a way, we
obtain the relative index of the new sub-tree. The MIN circuit in the final level outputs
the plain index to Alice, Bob or both. Considering that the input bitlength changes at
Hamming
distance
Hamming
distance
Hamming
distance
Hamming
distance
MIN MINMIN
‖ CM ‖ 
mask(q)
mask(X1) mask(X2) mask(X3) mask(XN)
MIN
min index
argMIN TREE
Fig. 1: Iris identification scheme.
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each level, a different circuit has to be described for each level. It is important to note
that if in a level the number of k inputs is odd, we need k/2 MIN selectors, but if k
is even, (k− 1)/2 max selectors are needed. In the second case the last value needs
to be propagated to the next level and the bit 0 has to be concatenated. This can be
done through a false MIN selector circuit, as shown in Figure 3. Hence in a level i each
MIN block has 2 inputs represented by dlog2 `e+ i secrets and 1 output represented by
dlog2 `e+ i+ 1 secrets. The final MIN block (level dlog2 n+ 1e− 1) differs from the
others because its output is composed by dlog2 n+1e bits.
It is important to note that all the sub-circuits placed in the same level in Figure 2
(input interfaces, HDs, MINs of level i) can be evaluated in parallel. Moreover only a
description file for each block type is necessary.
We suppose that server and client perform garbling, OT precomputation and trans-
mission of the garbled circuit offline, to provide the most efficient computation when
real data is available. As already mentioned, OT precomputation is performed by using
the OT extension protocol that, in our case, performs≈ 1.000.000 OTs offline in abount
5 seconds, hence the OT precomputation runtime reported in the table is the portion of
the time referred to 2048 OTs (the same implementation is used for all the solutions).
Tests have been performed on a system with two Intel Xeon E5-2609@2.4 GHz with
10 Mbytes of cache and 16 Gbyte of RAM connected to a Fast Ethernet network (100
Mb/sec.). Each ES-2609 has four cores, hence the total number of available cores is
eight.
Table 1 shows the different implementation runtimes needed for each element of the
protocol when 8 threads are used (except for sequential implementation). During the of-
Hamming
distance
Hamming
distance
Hamming
distance
Hamming
distance
‖ CM ‖ mask(q) mask(X1) mask(X2) mask(X3) mask(XN)
min index
Garbler
input
interface
Evaluator
input
interface
MIN
level 1
MIN
level 1
MIN
level 1
MIN
level log2N
Garbler
input
interface
Garbler
input
interface
Garbler
input
interface
Garbler
input
interface
Fig. 2: Block subdivision of iris identification scheme for coarse-grained parallelization.
Parallel Implementation of GC-based MPC Protocols 11
Phase S FG CG CG+FG
O
ffl
in
e Garbling 9.772 3.475 2.175 1.860
OT Prec. 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Garbled table Tx 1.701 1.314 0.036 0.690
O
nl
in
e Bob’s secret Tx 0.338 0.378 0.130 0.158
Alice’s secret Tx 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
Evaluation 3.437 2.899 1.019 1.765
Table 1: Runtimes (in seconds) of iris identification protocol by using sequential implementation
(S), fine-grained (FG) parallelization, coarse-grained parallelization (CG), or both. 8 cores have
been used in parallel implementations.
fline phase the same OT precomputation protocol has been used for all the solutions.
We can easily observe that all the parallel solutions provide better runtimes with respect
to the sequential solution. As expected, the parallelization of the single gates introduces
a management overhead greater than the one introduced by macroblock parallelization.
On the other hand, the use of gate parallelization inside parallelized macroblocks pro-
duces worst results with respect to the coarse-grained parallelization, but the solution is
still preferable than fine grained parallelization.
Figure 4 shows the offline, online and total runtimes of the different implementa-
tions as a function of the number of threads. We can see that the performance increase
with the number of threads, especially in the solutions that rely on coarse grained par-
allelization having a trend that is inversely proportional to the number of threads used.
Indeed the results are affected by the number of cores available and their turnover due
to the system inactivity time. We can observe that, having 8 cores, there is no more
improvement if more than 16 threads are used.
even
inputs
odd
inputs
inN−1 inN−2
pos|min
in0in1
1N/2
inN−1
0|inN−1
MIN
level i
pos|min
note:
N = n+12i+1 MIN
level i
false MIN
level i
inN−2 inN−3
pos|min
in0in1
1(N − 1)/2
MIN
level i
pos|min
MIN
level i
(N − 1)/2 + 1
Fig. 3: Subtree level composition.
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4.2 AES encryption
As a second test case, we evaluate our solution on the commonly used circuit for obliv-
ious 128 bit AES encryption3 [8]. This circuit is often used as benchmark in MPC
implementations for boolean functions, due to its relatively random structure and large
size. The idea is to encrypt a value known by Alice by using an encryption key known
by Bob.
Here we are interested to compare our sequential and fine-grained implementations
to the one described in [16]. The obtained results are shown in Table 2.
For a single AES implementation, macroblock parallelization cannot be used, any-
way fine-grained parallelization guarantees better results than sequential implementa-
tion. To compare our solution to other implementations, we run Huang et al. code [16]
3 Boolean circuit description kindly provided by Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider, Nigel P.
Smart and Stephen C. Williams.
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Threads
0
6
12
se
cs
(a) Offline
2 4 8 16 32
Threads
0
2
4
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(b) Online
2 4 8 16 32
Threads
0
8
16
se
cs
(c) Total
Seq. ◦ F.G. + C.G. × C.G.+F.G.
Fig. 4: Iris execution times.
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Phase S FG Huang et al.
O
ffl
in
e OT Prec. 0.001 0.001 0.540
Garbling 0.133 0.082
0.898
Garbled table Tx 0.039 0.044
O
nl
in
e Bob’s secret Tx 0.000 0.000 0.038
Alice’s secret Tx 0.013 0.002 0.086
Evaluation 0.066 0.017 0.311
Table 2: Runtimes (in seconds) of AES encryption protocol by using sequential implementation
(S) and fine-grained (FG) parallelization. 8 cores have been used in parallel implementations. We
run Huang et al. implementation in the same hardware used for our tests.
on the same computer used for our tests, obtaining results worse than ours. Again we
can also observe that fine-grained parallelization offers better performance than serial
execution.
To extend our analysis, we used the AES circuit as a block in a coarse grained
parallelization of a circuit encrypting more than 128 bits provided by Alice by using
the 128 bit encryption key of Bob, as shown in Figure 5.
For our tests we imagine to encrypt a gray-scaled image of size 256× 256 pixels,
hence n= 4096 AES encryption blocks are evaluated in parallel by using coarse-grained
parallelization. Considering that associating a secret to an input available on the evalua-
tor side is more expensive than associating a secret to an input available on the garbling
side, Alice, having 256× 256× 8 input bits, acts as garbler, whereas Bob, having 128
input bits, acts as evaluator. In Figure 6 we can observe the offline, online and total
AES AES AES
block0 block1 blockn−1encryption
key k
AESk(block0) AESk(block1) AESk(blockn−1)
Fig. 5: Two-party computation of 128-bit AES on large amount of data.
Sequential 2 4 8 16
Threads
0
70
140
210
280
se
cs
Offline
Online
Total
Fig. 6: Multiple AES execution times.
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runtime of the protocol. As expected, parallel evaluation of AES blocks provides a sig-
nificant improvement, confirming again that runtime decreases as ≈ 1/threads and by
using 16 threads each AES takes less than 4ms online.
4.3 Security analysis
Parallel processing of single gates does not compromise the security of the protocol. As
a matter of fact, the view of Alice and Bob in the fine-grained parallelization is equal to
the one (except for the different order) obtained in the classical implementation. Coarse
grained parallelization produces many GCs from a small number of description files
that are combined to evaluate a more complex functionality. Again the view of Alice
and Bob is equal to that obtained by evaluating a single larger garbled circuit in the
common sequential implementation. Hence, being the security for Yao’s protocol in the
semi-honest model demonstrated in [22], also security of parallel implementations is
granted.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that parallel processing can significantly improve the ef-
ficiency of Garbled Circuit technique in multi-party computation protocols. Two dif-
ferent types of parallelization have been proposed. Fine-grained parallelization allows
the parallel evaluation of any garbled circuit processed to identify layers containing
indipendent gates that can be evaluated concurrently. Coarse grained parallelization is
based on the parallelization of macro-blocks and can be used whenever the same block
is evaluated in parallel on different data.
The efficiency of the parallel implementations has been analyzed by addressing a
biometric scenario, having an intrinsic parallel nature, and AES encryption. We demon-
strated that both fine-grained and coarse-grained solutions provide significant runtime
improvements. Macroblock parallelization is preferable when allowed by the intrinsic
nature of the application, such as in a biometric identification scenario, otherwise gate
parallelization can be used. The joint use of both techniques, by evaluating in parallel
macroblocks, whose gates are still processed in parallel, results in a slight improvement.
Considering the results provided in this paper, efficient circuits for parallel GC eval-
uation could have different shapes with respect to circuits for classical sequential GC.
By using coarse-grain parallelization a circuit designer is no more focused on the de-
velopment of a whole optimized circuit, but to design blocks that can be evaluated in
parallel, even if some gates can be superfluous. In fine-grained parallelization, even if
reducing the number of non-XOR gates is still important, sometimes circuits with more
gates can be evaluated more efficiently than others if they are characterized by a high
level of parallelization. For example, having 8 threads available, the parallel evaluation
of 4 gates can be more efficient than the sequential evaluation of only two gates. An
accurate analysis of this issue is left for future research.
To extend our analysis, we are interested to apply our solutions to Garbled Circuits
in a malicious setting and running the protocols on GPUs.
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